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INTRODUCTION

In 1926 The Methodist Recorder published a tribute to visionary college
president and holiness scholar Asa Mahan:
There are two characteristics that often mark great minds-characteristics
which are antagonistic and apparently irreconcilable. We might designate
one of these as the philosophic or rationalistic tendency, and the other as
the mystical or religious tendency. Both of these attributes were found in
Dr. Mahan, developed to a high degree. I
The uniting of these orientations gave rise to a life of integrative energy. Asa
Mahan was at once philosopher and theologian, teacher and pastor, social
reformer and spiritual guide. Perhaps no fusion was a more pronounced
expression of Mahan's witness than that of deep, personal intimacy with God
and broad, uncompromising social action. Spiritual experience and societal
justice belonged together.
What about today's Wesleyan and Pentecostal movements? Is the strong
emphasis upon Christian experience and the transforming presence of God a
distraction from social justice or does it have liberating effects? Surely the history
of accessibility and welcome around issues of social class demonstrates one
important legacy. Yet the passion for experience can degenerate into solipsistic
practices and individualistic escapism. How might Wesleyan/Pentecostal
movements celebrate the appropriate subjectivity of experience while
simultaneously grounding their theological reflection in engagement with a world
of objective realities and with the demands of social justice?
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This paper will juxtapose the "philosophic" a nd "mystical" ele ments within the life
and work of Asa Mahan. It will briefly point this synthesis forward by reading Mahan
through th e le ns of Karo l Wojtyla (john Paul II) . Such a vision of the C hristi an li fe is
rooted in a reconciliatio n of the subj ective a nd th e objective in human ex istence. Th e
subj ec tive quali ties of hum a nity ex press th e mselves thro ugh a n a p preciatio n fo r
interio rity and spiritual expe rie nce. Th e objective qualities of hum anity elevate the
person beyond her o r his private ex perie nce and de mand parti cipati on amo ng both
divine and hu man community. This relatio nal destiny lives as a kind of o bjectively
established "inte rsubj ectivity" between persons and God and amo ng humanity. Such
inte rco mmunio n is exactly what Mahan meant whe n he ex plo red 'The Fellowship of
the Spirit. '" It is also precisely what Wojtyla intends whe n he spea ks of "participatio n"
or "solidarity."] In articulating a faith that defin es the human person as a being for
re lations hi p, Wes leya n/ Pe ntecostal move m e nts possess a powerful reso urce fo r
affirmin g both in timacy wi th God and justice for all of God's people.
B EYOND OBIECTIVISM AND SUBIECTIVISM'

Nea r th e e nd of hi s life, Asa Maha n published hi s magnum op us two-vo lume
history of philosophy.' Prior to presentatio n of the complete work, he released the
eighty-page introductory section as an independent treatise· Thi s abbreviated piece
served as a synopsis of Mahan's entire metaphysical and epistemological schema.
In signature fashio n, th e elder philosopher begins with first principles:
We now advance to a consideration of the hypothesis which lies at the foundation
of this entire Treatise, the hypothesis about which all the inductions, deductions,
expositions, and elucidations of said Treatise revolve. The hypothesis is this: Four,
and but four, realities ever have been, or by any possibility can be, represented as
realities in human thought. We refer, of course, to spirit and matter, time and space.'
Ma ha n continues by categori zing th ese fo ur rea lities according to the d istinction
between necessary and contingent ideas. Space a nd time fall under the designation of
necessary ideas. Matter and spirit dwell in the realm of contingent ideas. Yet, fo r Asa
Mahan, knowl edge of matter and spirit is just as certain as that of space and ti me; the
necessa ry a nd the co ntinge nt possess e qu al claim to abso lu te ce rtain ty ' T hi s
epistemo logical confidence leads Mahan to expo und a type of realism. In fact, the
re mainder of his discourse is devoted to advocating this approac h in opposition to
materialism, idealism, and scepticism.
Ma han un de rstood mate rialism in standa rd ph ilosophi cal term s, as a doctrin e
which affi rmed matter as the "only existing substance."· Idealism was described as a
viewpoint which resolved "all realities into mind, or its operations."'o Scepticism denied
the abili ty to define any funda mental ex pressio n of reality beyond "mere appea rance.""
Therefore, in one sense, Mahan reiterated the threadbare metaphys ical categories of his
day and in propounding some manifestatio n of realism placed himself in the company
of habitually-dismissed nineteenth-century thin kers. " Yet often overlooked is Mahan's
im pressively calibrated exploratio n of subj ect/object relations.
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If Mahan was so predictably hard on materialism, idealism, and scepticism, it was,
at least in part, due to his passion for integrating the subjective and the objective in
human understanding. Not only was materialism critiqued as a fallacious monism of
the tangible. It was also faulted for its assertion that "knowledge is possible but in its
objective form, that is, relatively to 'things without US."'ll Likewise, idealism invites
rebuke not only for its singular emphasis upon the immaterial. It also committed the
fallacy of proposing that "knowledge is possible but in its subjective form, that is,
relatively to mind. "14 Scepticism not only failed to uphold the possibility of real
knowledge. It implemented this denial with reference to both subjective and objective
categories of perception.l s Mahan's affirmation of realism was as much about his
concern to defend the authority of knowledge in both its subjective and objective
forms as it was about anything else. 16
One need not read very far to witness that this integration of the subjective and the
objective is woven through Mahan's entire philosophy As early as 1840 he stated that
"contingent phenomena perceived by the intelligence, are of two kinds, subjective, and
objective."I ? These contingent ideas of both matter and spirit (as distinguished from
necessary ideas) are directly linked to objective and subjective reality. Even the very
nature of law is defined with reference to this dual emphasis. Law, objectively
considered, refers to action "in conformity with certain rules. "18 Law, subjectively
considered, refers to "an idea in some intelligent mind." 19
This delineation becomes particularly critical when Mahan considers the ethical
aspects of law The differentiation and integration of subjectivity and objectivity signals
the uniqueness of humanity's moral stature. As Mahan argues, law exists objectively in
brute or animal creation but lives both objectively and subjectively in people.20 In
essence, an objectively anchored subjectivity is correlated with free will and the
"Divine image" in which humanity was created.21
Thus, Asa Mahan's employment of subject/object typologies ultimately revolves
around a particular expression of philosophical anthropology. As was commonplace
for his day, Mahan articulated a type of faculty psychology that identified the
Intelligence, the Sensibility, and the Will. Within the Intelligence he further located
three primary faculties: Consciousness, Sense, and Reason.22 This garden-variety (some
might say uninspired) scholasticism takes an intriguing turn when it engages the
universe of subject/object relations.
According to Mahan, Consciousness bears a particular relationship to "subjective
phenomena," Sense to "objective phenomena, " and Reason to "universal and
necessary truths ."23 These three primary faculties are held to be so significant that
personal identity and interaction with the world are unfathomable apart from them.
Critical understandings of self, others, and the relationship between these two realities
find voice in this triadic structure.
Late in life, Mahan brought his two-volume history of philosophy to a close with

these words:
In all schools of Philosophy in all ages, as well as by the rest of mankind [sicJ, it
is admitted and affirmed, that in all minds in common there is an absolute
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consciousness of a knowledge direct and immediate of the Self as an interior
subject exercising the functions of thought, feeling, and willing, and of the Notself as an exterior object, having real extension and form, and of Space and
Time as absolutely necessary and implied realities 2 4

Self as subject, Not-self as object, and Space and Time as truths of implied knowledge
correspond to the four realities of spirit, matter, space, and time. The first two (spirit
and matter} represent contingent ideas perceived through the primary faculties of
consciousness and sense. The latter two (space and time) represent necessary ideas
apprehended through the primary facuIty of implied knowledge or reason .2S
This laboriously close rebuttal of idealism and materialism, as well as scepticism,
served to avoid the extremes of subjectivism and objectivism. In Mahan's view, only
when both the subjective and the objective are held in meticulously conceived
synthesis does a proper anthropology emerge. The subjective or realm of the Self,
unhinged from the objective or Not-self, is prone to an egocentric subjectivism. The
objective or realm of the Not-self, unhinged from the Self, is ripe for a dehumanizing
objectivism. The philosophical framework was thus established for exploring the
depths of intercommunion between people and between humanity and God.
THE FELLOWSHIP OF THE SPIRIT/INTERSUB/ECTIVITY

By

PARTICIPATION

It is against the backdrop of Mahan's surprisingly supple realism that one must
approach his doctrine of the Holy Spirit. As the holiness professor's corpus grew during
a half century of writing and teaching, it acquired a twofold character. On the one side
were specifically philosophical publications, on the other pieces devoted to Christian
perfection and the work of the Holy Spirit. In 1870, while president of Adrian College
in Michigan, Mahan released his landmark series of lectures, The Baptism of the Holy
Chost. 26 The explicit purpose of this book was an exploration of pneumatology and
Christian experience, but the work also expressed an implicitly relational anthropology
that was consistent with Mahan's philosophy of subject/object interaction.
The ninth chapter of this treatise is seminal. Grounded in an exegesis of 1 John,
"Discourse IX" probed the dynamic of human experience as it illumines that which
Mahan called 'The Fellowship of the Spirit."27 The language of "fellowship" is not at all
an imprecise employment of devotional speech. Mahan meant something very
particular when he invoked this term, something that needed to be differentiated from
"mere companionship" and from "partnership."28
Companionship referred to the given existence of two or more minds in the same
locale and the rudimentary interchange of thought between these minds. Partnership
implied not only a common proximity and elementary exchange of thought; it also
included "co-operation for the promotion of common ends."29 As Mahan defined the
quality and character of human relations, both companionship and partnership fell
under the rubric of "mere external connection."lD Real fellowship is something higher,
something deeper, and something much more intimate.
Two minds may be juxtaposed in "the most endearing external relations."J! They
may share a certain level of thought with one another. They may even form a
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partnership for common ends. Yet they may never enjoy authentic fellowship . Mahan
defines the potential obstruction to fellowship as "principles which may render each to
the other the object of inward aversion."32 True fellowship, in contrast, entails a
sympathetic union of "thought with thought" and "feeling with feeling," "sentiment
with sentiment" and "purpose with purpose." This reciprocal action is further
described as "an intercommunion, in which each becomes to the other, as it were,
another self."33 In essence, superficial companionship and partnership remain
susceptible to the treatment of one another as mere "objects." Genuine fellowship
requires the kind of intimacy through which people become selves or "subjects" for
one another. This intersubjectivity is what Asa Mahan means when he invokes the
language of fellowship.
In light of these considerations it is fair to ask whether this kind of relationship is
possible between humans and God. At first blush, the sort of intensity implied by
Mahan's "fellowship" might argue against such divine/ human familiarity. One could
even suggest that only human arrogance would posit a relationship between the finite
and the infinite whereby a person might consider God as "another self. "
Philosophically speaking there is a danger of collapsing the other's objectively existing
subjectivity into one's own subjectivity. In short, Mahan's kind of intimacy can be
misinterpreted as subjectivism.
Yet it is precisely at this point that the explication of "fellowship" opens a more
profound consideration. One is reminded of the words from Karl Barth:
All communion with this God is barred, of the kind of communion we might
have with creatures, such that the Thou can be changed by the I into an It or a
He, over which or whom the I thereby acquires powers of disposal ... The
Subject of revelation is the Subject that remains indissolubly Subject. We cannot
get behind this SUbject. It cannot become an object.34
In a rather paradoxical manner, subjectivism serves to strip the other of appropriate
subjectivity The confession of God as Self or Subject acknowledges the divine
prerogative and denies that intimacy with God can ever become a kind of
manipulative "companionship" or "partnership" in which the finite reduces the infinite
to an object. 35 Just as subjectivism objectifies the other, an appropriate objectivity
respects the subjectivity of the other. This painstakingly conceived integration of
subject/ object relations is at the core of Asa Mahan 's "fellowship, " and this
divine/ human intercommunion blossoms through the work of the Holy Spirit.
Therefore, Mahan understands the baptism of the Holy Ghost not as some private
experiential possession (a view that could easily lead to subjectivism) but rather as the
fulfillment of an objectively situated God/ human intersubjectivity. He refers to I John 1:3:

You will observe that it is not said, that "our fellowship is with the Father, with
the Son, and with the Holy Ghost," but "with the Father, and with His Son Jesus
Christ." It is not with the Spirit that the mind has direct intercommunion; but
through the Spirit, with the Father and with Christ. 36
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This statement is not an attempt to deprecate the Holy Chost. Quite the contrary, it is
Mahan's way of maintaining the absolutely unique identity and critical wo rk of the
Trinity's third pe rson. It is also his way of challe nging a solipsistic obsess io n with
private experience by calling the believer to consideration of wider re latio nal issues. In
sho rt, 'The mission of the Spirit, .is to bring the soul into direct and immediate
inte rcommunion and fe llowship with Cod." l7 Moreove r, this o bj ective ly fra med
fellowship be tween divin e and human subjects serves as a paradigm fo r huma n
community. The inte rsubj ectivity of the Cod/ human relationship calls fo rth a kingdo m
of intersubjectively related people of Cod.
Asa Mahan's nine tee nth-century exposition of "The Fe llowship of the Spirit" is
re markably simila r to the twe nti e th -century ph e nome nologi ca l rea lism of Ka ro l
Wo jtyla (jo hn PaullD . Wojtyla begins his first major work by exploring 'T he Person as
the Subject and Object of Action."38 At root is an ontological convictio n that pro per
subjectivity can no t exist without appropriate objectivity. According to Wo jtyla, "We
must, the n, be clear right from the start that every subject also exists as an o bj ect, an
o bj ective 'some thing' or 'some body "'39 Correspondingly, the human person, as a
particular kind of object, must be described as a "somebody," a ratio nal being who, in
addition to a necessary objectivity, possesses a unique subj ectivity
The quintessential expression of Wojtyla's integration is found in his philosophical
opus, The Acting Person (1969/ 1979): ° Here the complexity of subj ect/ object relatio ns
te rminates in a conceptual understanding reminisce nt of Asa Mahan's "fellowshi p."
Wo jtyla describes this reciprocal dynamic as "Intersubjectivity by Participatio n."41 In a
late r article, he clarifies the meaning of this terminology' " . . .1 conceive participatio n in
The Acting Pe rson as a positive relation to the humanity of o the rs, unde rstanding
humanity here not as the abstract idea of the human be ing, but. .as the pe rsonal self,
in each insta nce unique and unrepeatable."42 Furthe r on he continues in la nguage
almost identical to that of Mahan :
The thou stands befo re my self as a true and complete "o the r self," w hich, like
my own self, is characterized not only by self-determinatio n, but also and above
all by self-possessio n and self-gove rnance. In this subj ective structure, the thou as
"anothe r self' represents its own transcendence and its own tendency toward
self-fulfillme nt. 4l
The subj ective and objective are therefore integrated in two fundamental ways. First,
the human subject objectifies the self through the act of conscio usness.44 Second, the
objective reality of the other is affirmed in all of its subjectivity. This really existing
mutual subjectivity lives as an obj ective ly referenced intersubjectivity amo ng selves. It
is no t at all surprising that Wojtyla ultimately links this relatio nal a nthropology to his
own understanding of "Life According to the Spirit."45
THE FUTURE OF DIALOGICAL REALISM

With the preceding analysis in mind, it is possible to offer some particular suggestions.
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( I) It may be necessary for holiness people to entertain anew the strengths of some
carefully delineated realism. This statement must welcome examination, given the way
realism can be conceived as a simplistic epistemological perspective. Much
contemporary reflection on nineteenth-century philosophy has rightfully critiqued the
unsophisticated nature of evangelical realism. If one adds to this the identified
correlation between realistic epistemologies and the rigidity of fundamentalism, one
has good reason to be wary of anything that might resurrect the predispositions of
"common sense."'6
The practice of contrasting nineteenth-century evangelicalism's purported "na'ive
realism" with more contemporary kinds of "critical realism" provides further impetus
for spurning those of Mahan's age as little more than hack philosophers" Yet
encountering the scrupulously formed contours of Asa Mahan's realism evokes a
more generous assessment. His epistemology did claim an ability to know things as
they are, but it did so as a considered alternative to the objectivism of materialism, the
subjectivism of idealism, and the nihilism of scepticism. When viewed in this context,
Mahan's philosophy takes on a richer, more subtle quality. The upshot is not so much
a predictably overconfident theory of knowledge as it is a nuanced relational
anthropology. Hence, one might argue that Mahan's thought is neither "na'ive" nor
"critical." It is, rather, dialogical.
This deliberate juxtaposition of subjectivity and objectivity is at the heart of
Mahan's pneumatology The baptism of the Holy Ghost represents the apex of
subjectivity, interiority, and spiritual experience. But it also includes the most
ontologically profound kind of objectivity, engagement with the other, and affirmation
of relationship. Religious experience becomes not an end in itself but a gateway to the
real meaning of solidarity. Both the subjective and the objective are as critical for
Mahan's notion of Spirit baptism as they are for his epistemology. Thus, one's social
and solidaristic orientation becomes a bellwether of one's spiritual depth, and one's
spiritual maturity becomes a measure of one's social and solidaristic authenticity.
(2) It is precisely this Spirit-inspired "dialogical realism" that beckons comparison
with the more imaginative emphases of Karol Wojtyla's thought, and here Mahan
speaks a word for our time and for our future. Wojtyla concludes his seminal work on
the human person with, among other topics, an analysis of "individualism" and "antiindividualism."" Individualism roots itself in an extreme form of subjectivism that
enthrones the private desires of the self to the exclusion of the other Antiindividualism grounds itself in a dehumanizing objectivism that strips the human agent
of all dignity. It is no stretch to read in this discussion an anthropological critique of
both capitalism and Marxism. Wojtyla's philosophical confrontation with "dialectical
materialism" and its accompanying "objectivism" is now lauded. But his multifaceted
anthropology has also given rise to a judgment upon capitalism's quasi-idealism and its
corresponding "subjectivism." In his 1995 encyclical, Evangelium Vitae, John Paul 11
leveled a post-Cold War broadside at the West and identified a "mentality which
carries the concept of subjectivity to an extreme and even distorts it."·9
Given Asa Mahan's own refreshingly well integrated commitment to subject and
object, one wonders if there might be resources in the holiness heritage for the kind of
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a nthropo logy that will offer an alternative to both Ma rxist anti-individuali sm a nd
capita list individua li sm . At present the self-aggrandizem e nt of eco nomic e lites is
celebrated a mong a world disillusioned by collectivist failures, but does capitalism in
the age of globalization and its narcissistic excesses reflect an adequate unde rsta nding
o f the huma n pe rson? If one conside rs the more dialogica l aspects of both Ma ha n a nd
Wojtyla on e must raise significant doubt. The a nswe r to oppressive o bj ectivism can
no t be a self-a bsorbed subj ectivism. It will re main for future refl ection to d evelop a n
adequa tely de tailed articulation of some alternative model. Suffice it to say that this
"Fe ll o w ship o f th e Spirit," this "Inte rsubj ectivity by Pa rti cipa tion," thi s "dia logica l
rea li sm " sugges ts c ru cial anthropol o gical in sights oft e n ov e rl o ok ed in to d ay's
philosophical and theological conve rsation.
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